

inevitably. For these reasons they dread war.

M. Stavriki says that it is a mistake to suppose that King Constantine is unfriendly to England.

The Rome correspondent of THE SUN telegraphs that he learns from diplomatic sources that Greece, in addition to offering guarantees not to interfere with the allied forces, promises also partial demobilization of the Greek army, retaining part of her troops under mobilization in order to provide for her own defense. At the same time Greece refuses to intervene in favor of the Allies unless her own interests are threatened. The Athens correspondent of the Exchange Telegraph Company says the Greek reply is "friendly, meets the Entente Powers' demands and gives all guarantees that are considered essential."

The correspondent, however, remarks that King Constantine has been successful in his main contention, which was that Greece should remain neutral. Athens public opinion is considering the possibility that Bulgaria will attempt to annex Greece as well as Serbian Macedonia, in which case Greece, with her army at least partially mobilized, would at once take the field to defend her territory, an action which would align her definitely on the side of the Entente.

STRIKE FOR RAILWAY.

Balkan-Turkish Forces Advance on Mitrovica-Takub Line.

Special Cable Dispatch to THE SUN.

LONDON, Nov. 25.—The Austro-Hungarian army commanded by Gen. von Kovesics has advanced through the city to the south on the east bank of the Sittica and is near Vucitrin. Meanwhile the German-Bulgarian forces have been fighting on the edge of the Kosovo Plain and are preparing to cross the Sittica.

The Mitrovica-Takub railway, already in the possession of the Austro-German forces at its northern terminal and from Kacanik south to Uskub, is apparently the objective of the Austro-German-Bulgarian movements in this region. The section of the railway still remaining in the hands of the Serbians south of Mitrovica, a stretch of roughly fifty-five miles, follows the valley of the Sittica for the northern half of this distance. The entire stretch of road cannot be cleared of the Serbians until these have been driven completely from the Kosovo Plain and from the heights to the north of Kacanik.

Montenegrins Repulsed.

The Vienna War Office announces today that the Austrian forces operating in the northwestern corner of New Serbia have repulsed the Montenegrins southwest of Sjenica and have crossed the Montenegrin frontier, which means that they have crossed the Lim, probably near Brodurevo.

Details of the prisoners and booty captured by the Austro-German-Bulgarian forces in the taking of Mitrovica and Pristina are given in the German and Austrian official statements today. The number of Serbians taken at Mitrovica is given by these statements at 10,000, along with a large amount of railway rolling stock, artillery and other material. At Pristina the figures given are 20,000.

The Austrian official statement follows:

We repulsed the Montenegrins southwest of Sjenica and crossed the Montenegrin frontier.

At Mitrovica the Austro-Hungarians captured 10,000 Serbians, six mortars, twelve field guns, a variety of vehicles, ammunition, seven railway engines and 130 railway wagons and other material. Advancing through Mitrovica, an Austro-Hungarian column reached the district of Vucitrin (a few miles south of Mitrovica).

South of Vucitrin the German-Bulgarian forces are on the point of crossing the Sittica.

In the fighting at Pristina 4,800 prisoners and six guns were captured.

The Berlin Report.

The German official statement says: The army under Gen. von Kovesics took about 10,000 Serbians and nineteen cannons near Mitrovica. In the Pristina swamp, on the Sittica, 7,400 prisoners and six cannons fell into our hands. The amount of war material and other supplies taken is important.

The communiqué issued by the French War Office tonight regarding the operations of the army of the Orient says: On the day of November 23 our troops had an engagement in the region of Bruzik, east of Kriovik, with the Bulgarian forces. The latter were repulsed.

The Times correspondent telegraphing from Monastir under date of November 23 says:

"The Bulgarians have not renewed their activity on the Prilep front. Firing was heard to-day south of Prilep. It is suggested that somebody has got behind the Bulgarians and is threatening their line of communications."

BULGARS ACCUSED.

German Commander Demands End of Outrages Against Serbs.

Special Cable Dispatch to THE SUN.

LONDON, Nov. 25.—The German correspondent of the Daily Mail says that Gen. von Mackensen has notified Gen. Jelov of the Bulgarian army that his cruel outrages against the Serbian population are endangering the rear of the army in the conquered districts and has peremptorily demanded that the outrages be stopped.

The same correspondent says the Austrians are strengthening their fortifications and are strengthening their communications along the Rumanian frontier.

GRENADERS ACTIVE.

Fighting in France Limited to Artillery and Bomb Exchanges.

Special Cable Dispatch to THE SUN.

PARIS, Nov. 25.—Fighting with hand grenades and artillery exchanges were the only activity on the front to-day. The afternoon communiqué was as follows:

In the Aisles and in Lorraine there was fighting last night with hand grenades in several districts. Our artillery directed the machine gun fire against the machine gun emplacements in the region of the Fraise Valley, in the Somme, and in the region of Royce, at the station at Beauvais and at Laucourt.

On the rest of the front there was the usual artillery fighting.

The official communiqué issued by the War Office to-night says:

There is no event of importance to report.

DANES TO WATCH REEXPORTS.

Make Pact With Britain Not to Re-ship "Certain Goods."

Special Cable Dispatch to THE SUN.

COPENHAGEN, via London, Nov. 25.—The following official statement was issued to-day:

"The conclusion of a new Anglo-Danish commercial arrangement has made a favorable impression. It is understood that an arrangement has been made between the British Foreign Office and representatives of the Danish Guild and the Chamber of Manufacturers of Copenhagen by which the latter guarantee that certain goods needed by Denmark will not be reexported."

SUVLA BAY BLUNDERER; "WHO?" ASKS BRITAIN

Officer Lost Commission for Tactics That Led to Dardanelles Disaster, but Identity Is Hidden and People Want No "Nameless Scapegoat."

Special Correspondent to THE SUN.

LONDON, Nov. 25.—The press is insistently urging the Government to reveal the name of the General responsible for the Suva Bay disaster. Every one is seeking to know the name of the man who is deprived of his commission because he was in command at Suva Bay on August 6. A dozen names have been confidently mentioned, but no one seems to know just who the man is. The Weekly Dispatch has the following to say on the subject:

"Why does the Government seek to preserve the secret? If the driver of an express train makes a mistake and causes the death of a score of passengers his name is made public at once. He is not infrequently served a sentence for manslaughter, the railway company concerned striving by all means in its power to vindicate its system and to show that the mishap was due to a personal error. Sympathy with such a man in his grief and humiliation does not prevent the public from punishing him. The law demands that he shall be punished, if only to encourage the others."

The mistake of Suva Bay has involved the allied Powers in a trouble of the first magnitude. Sir Edward Grey has told the House of Commons and the world at large that an important military operation was needed to swing the Balkan States to the side of the Entente Powers. The operation at Suva Bay gave promise of an advantage at least substantial enough to hold the balance even. It might have led to results that would have swung the scales in our favor.

Responsibility Not One Man's.

"The lost opportunity created by these vague words can only be outlined in the most sketchy fashion, but the British troops got into a bad position, and the possibility that no single person should be made the namesake scapegoat. It begins with the landing of British troops on Gallipoli."

Preparations had been made to prevent that landing, and it was only by a miracle of courage and pertinacity that the British troops got into a bad position. The possibility that no single person should be made the namesake scapegoat. It begins with the landing of British troops on Gallipoli."

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SAYS IF ALLIES WIN IT WILL BE IN WEST

France and North Sea Are Where Victory Lies, Col. Repington Thinks.

"BALKAN TIME WASTED"

Special Cable Dispatch to THE SUN.

LONDON, Nov. 25.—Col. Repington, the military critic of the Times, in the quiet confidence expressed by Mr. Bonar Law the other day regarding the outlook for the war, which, the writer declares, can have only one end—a victory for the Allies if correct principles of strategy are followed.

"I hope and believe that the British War Council will not again act contrary to the advice of the General Staff, as in the case of the Salonica expedition," he says.

After discussing the various theatres of the war Col. Repington continues: "On all the main fronts the situation is most hopeful, although not brilliant. I insist that the west and the North Sea are the decisive theatres and that victory will go to whichever side most consistently acts on that belief."

He admits that the German advance in the Balkans is a fine political coup of some manifest military advantages, but says he does not believe that any great German force will cross the Bosporus, but that the Germans will rather supply leaders, arms and munitions to the Turks and strengthen them with a nucleus of German troops and direct them against one or more of three objectives, namely, the Caucasus, Egypt and the East.

"It is vital," he says, "that the Allies shall not allow themselves to be diverted from the main purpose by these excursions. For us to open a great offensive campaign in the Balkans, especially at this season of the year, would be unprofitable strategy. Germany, on the other hand, is in a position to make a surprise attack on the Balkans, while the actions of Greece and Rumania are uncertain. The position of the enemy is altogether superior to ours, and it would require an immense expenditure of time, men and money to change it to our advantage. On the other hand, most of these people in the Balkans only become hostile to us when we stir them up or threaten to coerce them."

Col. Repington continues to the effect that the Allies have missed their chance in the Balkans and that it is not worth while to make the vast sacrifices necessary to obtain predominance there.

"In the circumstances," he says, "it is a good idea to make the Allies practically control about a million German, Austrian, Bulgarian and Turkish troops in the Balkan theatre, while the actions of Greece and Rumania are uncertain. The position of the enemy is altogether superior to ours, and it would require an immense expenditure of time, men and money to change it to our advantage. On the other hand, most of these people in the Balkans only become hostile to us when we stir them up or threaten to coerce them."

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FURIOUS FIGHTING ON ISLE IN DWINA

Reports From Petrograd Indicate Germans Are Withdrawing in Northern Sector.

ICE SHELLED, MANY LOST

Special Cable Dispatch to THE SUN.

LONDON, Nov. 25.—German and Russian war reports received yesterday indicate activity along the whole Russo-Gallian front, the most violently contested point being at the village of Beresmen, on the southern end of the Dahlen Island in the Dwina River, about five miles southeast of Riga. It has been taken twice in the last two days by the Germans, and from yesterday's report it is not certain who is in possession.

The Russians claim to be making headway on the entire front from Riga to Lake Swenton, west of Dwina. Their further assertion that they have driven the Germans back at Kemmern indicates that the Russian front still reaches west of Riga beyond Scholk to a point twenty-five miles along the Riga-Dwina railway.

A despatch to the Morning Post from Petrograd intimates that German military leaders, discouraged by the insuperable obstacles encountered in attempting to make any appreciable advance or even to hold their positions along the Riga-Dwina front, have decided to drop back beyond Mita. The evacuation of Mita, it is reported, has already been begun.

The Germans are constructing a strong line of trenches in their rear. Miles of wire entanglements are being set up, it is said, to the rear of their present positions. They are also busy building military railways from their battle line here to the interior of Germany.

A report from Copenhagen declares that the Russian troops defending the Sty River in Volhynia drowned a whole battalion of Austrians by the device of bombarding the ice on which their enemies were attempting to cross the river.

It is possible that the Russian version of this same incident is contained in the Petrograd report, which says that 100 Austrians were killed by being driven into the river and shot at while attempting to cross.

The Russian official statement given out yesterday in Petrograd follows: The Germans yesterday attempted to advance toward Kemmern, but were repulsed. Near the farm at Beresmen our troops took 100 German prisoners, six machine guns, and captured a hill. From the district southwest to Lake Swenton our troops made headway.

In the Smorgon district east of Wina the enemy artillery developed violent firing in some places.

The writers of the Petrograd report on the right bank of the Strumen River the enemy attacked Komara, but were repulsed.

Novo-Podcherevitch, on the left bank of the Sty, after a series of engagements remained in our hands. Near Senikowka, on the Strypa, part of our troops attacked the enemy and drove him to the river. With his back to the river the enemy was partly annihilated by our fire, remnants being driven into the river.

The official German statement yesterday is as follows: Army group of Field Marshal von Hindenburg, Beresmen is firmly held. Our troops took 100 German prisoners and five machine guns.

Army group of Prince Leopold and Gen. von Linsingen. The situation is unchanged.

Two German aviators, essaying to fly over the Russian lines near Dwina to make observations, were shot down in a marsh back of the Russian front. After the machine, which was of the albatross type, was allowed to pass the Russian batteries it was cut off by a flock of Russian aircraft.

The German machine flew about over a marsh for some time and then descended. Cosacks who had been watching it followed it on bicycles. Before they could find the aviators, however, they had frozen to death. The aeroplane was not damaged.

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